INTRODUCTION
The cosmetics giant Mary Kay requires that its Independent Beauty Consultants purchase at least $200 worth of product each month.
1 Unfortunately for Amy Weber, her relationship with Mary Kay was terminated because she failed to purchase the monthly minimum. 2 To dispose of her large inventory of unsold products, Mrs. Weber sold the products through her website, touchofpinkcosmetics.com, and through her "Touch of Pink" eBay store. 3 In 2008, Mary Kay brought action against Mrs. Weber in a Texas federal court under the Lanham Act, alleging that she was an unaffiliated online reseller of Mary Kay cosmetics and that her sales therefore constituted unfair competition, passing off, and trademark infringement. 4 In its pleadings, Mary Kay claimed that the website and eBay store's names created confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship-that is, consumers would wrongly assume that Weber was an authorized Independent Beauty Consultant affiliated with Mary Kay, even if that confusion ended prior to sale. 5 In her motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Weber argued that the first sale and nominative fair use doctrines rendered her sales lawful under the Lanham Act. 6 The court, however, denied her motion, 7 cies that advance the mark owner's ability to control all distribution channels would harm consumers and disincentivize competition; manufacturers would have less motivation to innovate and improve their product when they control all distribution of goods beyond their first sale. 15 This Article argues for an end to spurious claims of confusion where genuine goods are sold outside the manufacturer's distribution channel, as long as the reseller clearly disclaims any affiliation with the manufacturer or authorized distributor. This is in accord with the work of other scholars who have reached similar conclusions regarding irrelevant confusion, 16 the weak state of trademark fair use, 17 and the inadequacy of trademark defenses. 18 As with arguments in these areas, this Article contends that mark owners' attempts to increase the scope of their control over distribution channels thwart competition while doing little to protect consumers from deception. 19 These suggestions would protect the lawful sale of goods in the secondary market while allowing manufacturers to prevent counterfeit products from being sold online.
To begin this discussion, Part I looks at the nature of the Internet resale business, and the issues facing resellers regarding the use of the marks that are attached to the goods sold. This section tackles some of the practical difficulties that confront small resellers attempting to defend themselves against the mark owners in court. Part II focuses on the substantive legal issues that arise when a manufacturer uses initial interest confusion and a reseller's non-affiliation with "official" distribution channels of the good to limit competition. This Part examines how some courts have interpreted the law regarding fair use and confusion with regard to the online resale of genuine goods in a way that weakens the first sale doctrine in the process, 15 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 187.
[Trademark law] is designed to facilitate a competitive marketplace by allowing consumers to know what they are buying . . . . But a trademark law that is distorted into a right to own markets-one that seeks out and tries to forbid all free riding on a mark-ends up interfering with rather than enabling competition.
as well as the overlap of trademark and copyright infringement claims in the online resale market.
Part III elaborates on trademark law's fair use and first sale defenses, and some courts' reluctance to recognize these defenses in the case of resold goods. Part IV proposes that courts strengthen trademark's nominative fair use and first sale doctrines, while discounting the controversial doctrine of initial interest confusion, to protect legitimate online merchants while recognizing the need for manufacturers to stop online counterfeiters. We conclude that the first sale doctrine, which is well-established in patent and copyright law, and considered by both the courts and Congress as an important limitation to a mark owner's Lanham Act rights in the brick-andmortar setting, should include a presumption of non-infringement when a reseller is using a mark to truthfully inform consumers about the source of a genuine good.
I. THAT'S GONNA LEAVE A MARK
When one buys a Waterford crystal vase, the Waterford mark remains associated with the vase. No matter how many times that vase is sold, traded, gifted, regifted, or bequeathed, it remains identified as a Waterford vase. This serves a trademark's dual function of identifying the source of the vase and protecting the Waterford brand equity. 20 " [T] rademark law protects the producer from pirates and counterfeiters" and others who would attempt to exploit the good will established by Waterford. 21 However, merely because the Waterford mark remains inextricably linked to its vases as a source indicator does not and should not protect Waterford from controlling downstream sales of their goods outside their own distribution chains. 22 And while the Lanham Act is intended to promote quality goods and services by protecting producers' good will, it is irrelevant whether the customer even knows the identity of the source. 23 Consumers need not be able to identify the company behind a mark-for example, the fact that Kimberly-Clark makes "Huggies" disposable diapers is unimportant, so long as the consum- 20 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4 (1988) , reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A. N. 5577 , 5580 (stating that trademark protection serves a dual purpose: it "protects the public by making consumers confident that they can identify brands they prefer and can purchase those brands without being confused or misled"). In addition, the report states that the second function of trademark law is to protect the brand equity of mark owners, who spend "conside[r]able time and money bringing a product to the marketplace." Id. 21 Id. 22 Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995 ) (per curiam) (" [T] he right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend beyond the first sale of the product."). 23 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v er recognizes that the "Huggies" mark identifies a single source of the good. 24 
A. From Garage Sales and Consignment Shops to the Internet
Over the past ten years, casual resellers have migrated from garage sales, swap meets, and classified ads to eBay and Craigslist, turning side hobbies into lucrative businesses. Today, there are hundreds of books about selling goods online; 25 every month 30 million new ads are posted on Craigslist, 26 and every day six million new listings are posted on eBay. 27 The explosive online market has affected the sales of new goods, troubling manufacturers; 28 in turn, mark owners seek to curtail the growth of this secondary market through several avenues-some legitimate, and others not so much. 29 For example, to combat diversion to resellers outside of its official distribution chain, Tiffany, Inc., the well-known jeweler, attempted to institute a policy of limiting retail sales of identical items to lots of five or fewer, though this proved to be unsuccessful due to its sporadic enforcement. 30 Manufacturers have also used other means to stifle the resale market, such as filing claims of trademark and copyright infringement against both resellers and auction sites, 31 attempting wholesale removal of their goods on 24 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 3:7. 25 A search on Amazon.com for "selling on ebay" produced 1,629 results. Search for "selling on ebay", AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_c_1_15?url=search-alias%3Dstrip books&field-keywords=selling+on+ebay&x=0&y=0&sprefix=selling+on+ebay (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) . 26 auction websites and other unauthorized distribution channels, 32 and using auction site take-down notice procedures that are supposed to be reserved for removing counterfeit and infringing goods. 33 These actions go beyond trademark bullying and are more than merely stopping a merchant from using the owner's mark-the goal is to remove the reseller's goods from the market altogether. 34 Courts have aided manufacturers by ignoring the lack of confusion as to a good's source and finding that online initial interest confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation of the distribution channel-even when the goods are the genuine goods of the mark owner-constitutes infringement. 35 Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 36 for example, illustrated this phenomenon. 37 These courts' reasoning is contradicted by strong evidence showing that many consumers visit sites like eBay and Craigslist for the purpose of finding genuine goods at lower costs than they would find buying directly from the mark owner or authorized retailer, and are therefore not confused as to affiliation regarding distribution channel. 38 This is just one of many reasons, unrelated to trying to find the mark owner, for a consumer to use the mark in question as an Internet search term.
B. Genuine Goods
As long as the customer is not confused as to the source of these genuine goods, then the identity of the purveyor of the goods-whether it be the mark owner's own distribution channel or a reseller 40 -should be irrelevant. As source identifiers, marks "provide[] consumers with information they 32 See generally Mary Kay, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 846; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 33 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 34 See Goldman, supra note 14, at 574; Grinvald, supra note 14, at 651. 35 Goldman, supra note 14, at 585. Under a claim of initial interest confusion, a mark owner is arguing that there is trademark infringement because, even though the consumers' confusion is "dispelled before an actual sale occurs," the end result is that the defendant "impermissibly capitalizes on the [good will] associated with a mark . need (and cannot otherwise readily obtain) in order to match their desires to particular products." 41 Indeed, the legislative history of the Lanham Act and related case law recognizes the need to protect consumers from passing off or otherwise confusing customers into purchasing goods that are not the genuine goods of the mark owner. 42 Trademarks serve to (1) foster competition in the marketplace; 43 (2) encourage manufacturers to maintain the quality of goods; 44 (3) "discourage[] those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale"; 45 (4) help consumers locate products and services more efficiently; 46 and (5) serve as a "species of advertising." 47 And while trademark protection may have some anticompetitive consequences, "such protection may nevertheless remain justified so long as the mark improves the flow of otherwise indiscernible information concerning . . . the product to consumers, and . . . consumer desires to producers."
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C. The Harsh Realities of Pursuing Justice
Although it would appear that-based on nominative fair use and first sale/exhaustion principles-online secondary-sale merchants have a strong and valid affirmative defense against any claims of trademark infringement and should thus be free from interference by the mark owners, the reality of fighting these charges in court, or even battling take-down notices from 41 Lunney, supra note 19, at 369; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 3:12 ("A trademark is not merely a symbol of good will but is often the most efficient agent for the very creation of good will and consumer acceptance."). 42 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985) ; S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at Internet service providers ("ISPs") and online auction sites, may be enough to shut down a secondary market business. 49 The ISPs and auction sites also may face accusations of contributory infringement should they refuse to remove listings for the allegedly offending goods. 50 The roadblocks faced by small resellers who choose to defend themselves against the mark owners in court find the odds stacked against them even in getting to the courthouse steps. Even those who want to either proactively fight mark owners through declaratory judgment actions or defend themselves against infringement may not have the resources to do so.
Oftentimes, the small reseller is unable to afford an attorney to defend itself, 51 or if on the offensive, the stakes are too small for it to be economically feasible for an attorney to pursue a claim on behalf of the client. 52 A trademark owner's threat that it will sue the small business or individual if they do not comply with its demands is often enough economic pressure to force the small business or individual into compliance. Additionally, bullying occurs (when coupled with an unreasonable interpretation of rights) when trademark owners include a demand for attorney's fees in their cease-and-desist letters-even if the recipient complies-or claims that attorney's fees and costs will be awarded when the litigation against the small business or individual is found in favor of the large corporation (and the letter is often couched in terms that lead the recipient to conclude that the only outcome is that the large corporation will win). The small business or individual has no way of knowing that attorney's fees are awarded only in rare instances of trademark infringement. herself against take-down notices submitted by the mark owners associated with the goods she was selling. 54 At various times, Ms. Dudnikov's auctions were shut down due to recurring take-down notices, even though each time she successfully defended the claim and had the item relisted. 55 But in 2003, Major League Baseball ("MLB") had eBay delist items containing various baseball team logos, 56 and was able to have some of Ms. Dudnikov's auctions shut down for several days. 57 The attorneys with whom they spoke advised the couple either they had no case, or that it wasn't worth pursuing, 58 so Dudnikov and Meadors chose to bring a declaratory judgment action against MLB pro se, based on the trademark nominative fair use and copyright first sale doctrines. 59 Eventually, MLB agreed to settle the matter and have its complaints against Dudnikov's eBay account expunged. 60 The couple spent an enormous amount of time researching the law, and lost sales every time their auctions were shut down. 61 In addition, the cease-and-desist letters continued from other mark owners. 62 Karen Dudnikov chose to fight and publicized their struggle online against these large corporations. 63 Her inability to hire an attorney to represent them in her declaratory judgment action exemplifies one of several roadblocks facing resellers when they seek to defend their livelihoods. 64 And many small businesses would most likely choose to close shop rather than spend the energy and money required to defend themselves against the behemoths. Reseller-defendants may face the same fate as Veoh Networks, which, even though it was cleared of copyright infringement liability, was fatally wounded defending itself. 69 "Veoh is legal, but Veoh is dead-killed by rightsowner lawfare that bled it dry. Meanwhile, rightsowners wrongly assessed the legality of Veoh, but the worst consequence they suffered was overpaying their lawyers."
Id. (footnotes omitted
70 Likewise, resellers may be dead right, but dead nonetheless if they attempt to fight big plaintiffs who are more concerned with shutting down competition than proving infringement.
II. WAGING LAWFARE
In addition to using threatening cease-and-desist letters, mark owners have not been shy about pursuing their claims in court. 71 The most common and (3) this use is likely to cause customer confusion. 79 Of these elements, the last is the key in any infringement suit. 80 Supposedly, "likelihood" is not the mere possibility of confusion; customer confusion must be "probable," 81 and the likelihood of confusion must affect an "appreciable or substantial number of consumers."
82 Each circuit uses a similar set of factors to make this determination. 83 The factors adopted by the Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v Polaroid is a world-renowned manufacturer of photographic equipment, sheet-polarizing material, optical desk lamps, and other electronics products. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 494. Polaroid sued Polarad Electronics (manufacturer of microwave devices and television-studio equipment) for trademark infringement due to the similarity of its name and the proximity of the goods the two corporations manufactured. Id . at 493-95. In ruling in favor of Polaroid, the Second Circuit listed eight factors to be used to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's marks; (3) the proximity of the products or services covered by the marks; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion of consumers; (6) the defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of the defendant's product or service; and (8) consumer sophistication. Id. at 495.
Other circuits have adopted their own, similar versions of the Polaroid factors. For example, the Tenth Circuit uses a six-factor test first delineated in Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002) , declaring that, for determining likelihood of confusion, courts in that circuit examine (1) the degree of similarity between the marks; (2) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting the mark; (3) evidence of actual confusion; (4) similarity of products and manner of marketing; (5) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the strength or weakness of the marks. reseller's website, the consumer immediately realizes this is not the case.
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As noted by Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna, "'sponsorship' or 'affiliation' could refer to virtually any relationship between the parties," even ones that do not create any material confusion on the part of the consumer. 88 These terms are not defined in the Lanham Act, "so courts must interpret those terms and their interaction with the confusion requirement."
89
In their assertions, mark owners often compare this initial interest confusion to a "bait and switch"-the plaintiff claims that the defendant has used the plaintiff's mark in a way that gains the consumers' initial atten- 87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) ("Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely to . . . deceive as to the affiliation, connection, . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."). This is considered forward confusion, which occurs when the mark owner is arguing that "the alleged trademark infringer [is taking] advantage of the reputation and good will of a senior trademark owner by adopting a similar or identical mark. And while the purchaser knows it is a knock-off of a Louis Vuitton bag, others seeing the purchaser with the bag are not aware of this, and instead associate the cheap knock-off with the mark owner's product. Id. at 384. In addition to the mark owner being associated with inferior goods,
[t]he creation of confusion in the post-sale context can be harmful in that if there are too many knockoffs in the market, sales of the originals may decline because the public is fearful that what they are purchasing may not be an original. Furthermore, the public may be deceived in the resale market if it requires expertise to distinguish between an original and a knockoff. Finally, the purchaser of an original is harmed by the widespread existence of knockoffs because the high value of originals, which derives in part from their scarcity, is lessened.
Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000 tion. 90 Initial interest confusion relies on the notion that, due to being initially drawn to the competitor, [e] ven though the consumer eventually may realize that the product is not the one originally sought, he or she may stay with the competitor. In that way, the competitor has captured the trademark holder's potential visitors or customers.
Even if the consumer eventually becomes aware of the source's actual identity, or where no actual sale results, there is nonetheless damage to the trademark. This damage can manifest itself in three ways: (1) the original diversion of the prospective customer's interest to a source that he or she erroneously believes is authorized; (2) the potential consequent effect of that diversion on the customer's ultimate decision whether to purchase caused by an erroneous impression that two sources of a product may be associated; and (3) the initial credibility that the would-be buyer may accord to the infringer's products-customer consideration that otherwise may be unwarranted and that may be built on the strength of the protected mark, reputation and [good will]. 91 Initial interest confusion is a controversial claim and has not been accepted by all circuits. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit recognizes "that the use of another's trademark in a manner calculated 'to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion, may be still an infringement.'" 92 The Fourth Circuit, however, describes it as "relatively new and sporadically applied" and has refused to consider the doctrine as a legitimate claim under the Lanham Act. Cir. 2008 ) ("Initial interest confusion is a 'bait and switch' tactic that permits a competitor to lure consumers away from a service provider by passing off services as those of the provider, notwithstanding that the confusion is dispelled by the time of sale."). For a synopsis of the case history of initial interest confusion, see Rothman, supra note 14, at 114-21. In spite of Rothman's fervent attack on the doctrine, initial interest confusion has unfortunately yet to meet its demise. Id [It is based on the unsupported assumption] that a searcher using a trademarked keyword is looking for the trademark owner (or, perhaps, some authorized licensee or secondary user." (footnote omitted)). Professor Goldman discusses in detail the various reasons-other than trying to find the mark owner-for a consumer to be using the mark in question as a search term. Id. at 521-28.
The initial interest confusion doctrine "is at odds with the purpose, intent, and literal meaning of the Lanham Act" 94 and we should question the outright validity of the doctrine. 95 As Professor Jennifer Rothman argues,
[a]pplication of the initial interest confusion doctrine prevents comparative advertisements, limits information available to consumers, and shuts down speech critical of trademark holders and their products and services. The initial interest confusion doctrine undermines the free market system under a misguided notion that competition in and of itself is unfair.
B. Acts of Aggression
Encouraged by the expansion of trademark protection in the courts, mark owners have become increasingly aggressive in policing their marks. 97 Since "the middle part of the twentieth century, courts [have] expanded the range of actionable confusion beyond confusion over the actual source of a product-trademark law's traditional concern-to include claims against uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant [.] " 98 Courts are finding liability even when consumers "couldn't possibly have been confused about the actual source of the defendants' products." WHITTIER L. REV. 53, 54 (2003) ; see also Rothman, supra note 14, at 108 ("The creation and application of initial interest confusion doctrine directly contravenes the Lanham Act, the goals underlying trademark protection, other intellectual property laws, and the First Amendment."). 95 Rothman, supra note 14, at 111 (arguing that "the doctrine is wrong as a matter of policy and . .
. it represents an assault on the fundamental principles of trademark law"). 96 Id. at 108. 97 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 16, at 416-21 (evincing that the recipients of cease-and-desist letters from mark owners-who claim consumers would wrongly assume that the mark owner had granted permission or otherwise sponsored the mark's use by the defendant-usually cease using the mark, even when such use was most likely legitimate). "The recipients of all these threats . . . knew well that they had to take the asserted claims seriously because courts have sometimes been persuaded to shut down very similar uses." Id. at 418. 98 Id. at 414. 99 Id. at 421. 100 Id. at 421- 22. Resellers are often at the mercy of spurious trademark and copyright infringement claims, and some courts have ignored affirmative defenses in finding infringement. 101 As discussed supra, and as illustrated in the Mary Kay decision, some courts have accepted that confusion with regard to distribution of genuine goods is a valid form of trademark infringement, ignoring that there is no confusion as to the source of the goods-thus eviscerating the first sale affirmative defense. 102 These forms of confusion, however, were not envisioned to apply to a competitor's use of the mark to sell the mark owner's own goods. 103 Rather, it "results when a consumer seeks a particular trademark holder's product and instead is lured to the product of a competitor by the competitor's use of the same or a similar mark." 104 Thus, in spite of the genuineness of the article sold through resellers, these online resale businesses face the prospect of infringement suits, due to courts' broadening interpretation of what constitutes actionable confusion. 105 By rejecting a first sale defense based on initial interest confusionwhich lowers the bar for a finding of a likelihood of confusion and thus infringement liability-"courts have made it very difficult to resell goods online."
106 In essence, the ability to successfully claim initial interest confusion based on the distribution channel eviscerates the first sale/exhaustion defense for Internet resellers, even when any confusion ends before the sale is consummated. 107 For Amy Weber, this meant that her claim that she was 101 Grinvald, supra note 14, at 660-61. 102 Cir. 2006 ). 105 Lunney, supra note 19, at 371, 385. Since 1958, "the law's traditional willingness to permit a considerable degree of confusion in order to leave room for competitive imitation vanished, and courts began to seize on the slightest evidence of confusion as proof of infringement." Id. at 385. 106 Rothman, supra note 14, at 140-45. 107 See Buckman, supra note 91, at 607-08.
selling genuine Mary Kay goods fell on deaf ears. 108 Such decisions seem contradictory to both congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent.
C. Mixing It Up
Mark owners have also sought to indirectly stifle resellers by accusing the resellers' web hosts of infringement through claims of contributory infringement. 110 ISPs and online auction sites would find it very useful if there were an Internet safe harbor provision in the Lanham Act similar to the one that currently exists for copyright owners. 111 Under Section 512 of the Copyright Act, if a rights holder notifies a service provider such as eBay that infringing copyrighted material is stored in its system, in order to be immune from a suit for monetary damages, the service provider must promptly remove the allegedly infringing work. 112 The limitations of copyright A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider-(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstance from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
rights, however, should, in theory, thwart attempts to remove listings of genuine items for resale. 113 However, this copyright misuse leaves the mark owners vulnerable to lawsuits under Section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 114 The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce, make adaptations, distribute, publicly display, and publicly perform their works. 115 Since photographing a three-dimensional copyrighted work results in a reproduction and adaptation of that work, photographing a Waterford vase, even for the purpose of posting the photograph in an advertisement selling the lamp, would theoretically infringe on the copyright owner's reproduction and adaptation right, and avail the copyright owner of the Section 512 take-down provisions. 116 There are, however several limitations on these exclusive rights, 117 including one which protects such activities. Congress created a narrow exception to the exclusive reproduction and adaptation rights in copyrighted (ii) [i]dentification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed . . . (iii) [i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be infringing . . . that is to be removed . . . and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. * * * (v) [a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law [, and] (vi) [a] statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
Id. § 512(c)(3)
. 113 See id. § 512(f). 114 Id.
Misrepresentations.-Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section-(1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it.
Id.
115 Id. § 106. 116 See id. § § 106(1)-(2). 117 The Copyright Act grants the owner of the copyright the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public performance, public display, and digital broadcasts of sound recordings. works that have been lawfully reproduced in "useful article [s] ," such as a lamp, or an article of clothing. 118 Section 113(c) of the Act declares that it is not an infringement of the reproduction right 119 for others to make and distribute pictures or photos of a useful article, such as our hypothetical Tiffany lamp, in connection with ads or commentaries related to the distribution or display of such articles, so long as the lamp has been offered for sale or distributed to the public. 120 Consequently, it is lawful for a furniture store to feature a picture in a news ad or catalog of the lamp whose base is a statue, even though that would involve making a two-dimensional photographic reproduction of the statue. And, despite MLB's protestations, it was lawful as a matter of copyright law for Karen Dudnikov to display a photograph of MLB-logo items on her listing web page. 121 Since the photographs may be used to advertise goods for sale, this use should not expose the reseller to trademark infringement liability; otherwise Section 113 of the Copyright Act is meaningless. 122 Yet mark owners persist in bullying resellers to remove photographs of their items from websites based on a trademark likelihood of confusion claim, eviscerating the exception delineated in Section 113. 123 graphs . 128 Yet in addition to Section 113, the trademark first sale doctrine includes the ability to "stock, display, and resell"; posting photographs of products online amounts to displaying the products. 129 There was no reason the defendants should have removed the photographs. Their removal, according to Professor Rebecca Tushnet, is "caving to bullying" and unwarranted. 130 Since the first sale doctrine was originally borrowed from copyright law, 131 courts should consider that, since copyright law does not limit the right to use photographs of copyrighted material to advertise the sale of useful articles, 132 the same use should be not be grounds for a trademark infringement claim. The evident purpose is to allow further sales in commerce, 133 and the same limitation should be recognized with regard to trademark infringement claims. Moreover, product photographs can actually help mark owners identify counterfeit products. 134 So, ironically, by creating an environment in which product photographs cause liability, mark owners make it even more difficult-for themselves and consumers-to identify counterfeit products. 135 Of course, a major motive for removing photographs from the reseller's auction listings is that this will hurt sales. 15. Based upon information and belief, the defendant aggressively protects the copyrighted images. These actions include policing of flea markets, craft shows, craft malls, and Internet auctions sites. At crafts shows and flea markets, when hand-crafted items are found that use the fabrics portraying the copyrighted images owned by the defendant, cease and desist letters are distributed. On the auction sites, the auctions featuring similar fabric items are terminated at the request of the defendant. 16 . Based upon information and belief, Disney counsel knows, or reasonably should know, the fabric items are not derivatives as defined by federal courts, federal law and recognized authorities on copyrights. The intimidation tactics used by Disney are therefore illegal and immoral. They rely on the fact people can't fight back because of the potential enormous legal expense.
17. Based upon information and belief, on September 4, 2002, the defendant requested eBay® terminate three auction listing [sic] by Tabberone, falsely alleging to eBay® in an affidavit that the articles offered on these auctions were infringing items.
18. When asked, a representative of the defendant, a Deborah Perry, responded that the auctions were terminated because the fabric items were considered to be derivatives and therefore infringing upon the copyrights held by the defendant. backed down and agreed that Ms. Dudnikov's creations from licensed Disney fabric were not infringing uses. 141 Disney claimed copyright infringement to shut down her eBay auction, yet Disney's objection to Ms. Dudnikov displaying her crafts on her website was in direct conflict with the exemption under Section 113. 142 Thus, despite a demonstrably false copyright infringement claim, manufacturers such as Disney attempt to use the takedown provisions in Section 512 of the Copyright Act to remove online auction items listings. 143 Misusing copyright and trademark law points to a single objective: to decrease the competition of secondary markets. 144 Small dealers are faced with either defending themselves or ceasing operations. 145 And as previously discussed, even when a successful defense is likely, the costs of such litigation can be prohibitively expensive, and even the threat of litigation leads the secondary market merchants to abandon their online ventures. 146 22. The defendant, directly and through licensees, has released innumerable different copyrighted fabrics in the last few years through an estimated ten thousand national fabric outlets including Wal-Mart, Hancock Fabrics, and Joann Fabrics. It was the intention of the defendant that the fabric be cut, shaped, and sewn into fabric items such as pillows, bedding, wearing apparel, accessories, etc. There is no other purpose for selling uncut fabric.
Id
23. The Plaintiffs lawfully purchased the copyrighted fabric from retail outlet sources. Since the plaintiffs use of the copyrighted fabric was consistent with the intended purpose of the sale of the fabric, the subsequent sales of the fabric items falls wholly under the First Sale Doctrine. 144 See Grinvald, supra note 14, at 650-51. 145 See id. at 647. 146 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
Complaint
D. Further Pursuits
In addition to attacking resellers, in their aggressive pursuit to shut down the Internet resale market, mark owners have also taken their fight to ISPs and online auction sites, alleging contributory infringement based on resellers' use of these sites to advertise the mark owners' goods. 147 The
148
In their suits, mark owners allege that auction sites are not doing enough to stop counterfeiters; however, the mark owners also have the objective of removing genuine goods from this alternative distribution channel. 149 For example, in 2002, Tiffany & Co., the well-known jewelry company, began pressuring eBay to summarily remove Tiffany goods that met some general criteria-such as merchants selling more than five itemsalleging that any Tiffany items sold in bulk outside Tiffany's normal distribution chain had to be counterfeit. 150 When eBay refused to do so, Tiffany sued, contending that eBay was "facilitating and advertising the sale of 'Tiffany' goods that turned out to be counterfeit." 151 eBay was successful in defending both direct and indirect infringement claims based on the defenses of nominative fair use 152 and lack of control over the merchants who use the site. 153 The Second Circuit declined to find eBay contributorily liable, stating "that eBay's practice was promptly to remove the challenged listing from its website, warn sellers and buyers, 147 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d In spite of winning in court, these websites want to avoid suits for contributory infringement, and will take an unnecessarily strong conservative approach regarding accused listings. 158 The hosts want to ensure that they are viewed merely as "conduits" between the buyer and seller with no direct control over the listed goods, 159 and will usually remove listings based on any accusation by the mark owner. 160 If it is later proved (by the entity listing the good for sale) that it is indeed a genuine good and there is no confusion as to "distribution channel" affiliation, the item is relisted. 161 of removing/disputing/relisting, however, costs the resellers of genuine goods time, money, and frustration 162 and creates added burdens to both the reseller and the auction site, stifling the sale of goods for both parties. 163 Under the eBay model, every time an item is listed, the auction site earns a fee, and another fee is earned when the item is sold. 164 Yet when a "take down" occurs, the listing fee is returned to the seller, depriving the host of the fee for a legitimate good. 165 If the reseller eventually gives up due to the burden of constantly having to defend legitimate auction listings to the host, then both the reseller and the host lose the income that is generated from the listing and sale of the good. 166 A clearly defined and strong trademark first sale doctrine, however, would give auction hosting sites less concern over potential lawsuits by mark owners who don't like their items being sold outside their authorized distribution channels. 167 through eBay's website would benefit Tiffany in at least one sense: It would diminish the competition in the market for genuine Tiffany merchandise." Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98. 162 See, e.g., Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 517 n.39. The district court noted that,
[i]n addition, it is certainly possible that other listings have been erroneously reported. Tiffany refuses to authenticate items without proof that the items were purchased from a Tiffany store. Several sellers have complained to Tiffany that their items were inappropriately reported, only to have Tiffany refuse to offer any meaningful way of validating their legitimacy.
Id
. 163 
III. GETTING DEFENSIVE
It has been repeatedly acknowledged that the producer of a good cannot prevent others from using the good's mark to truthfully describe the good. 168 This basic belief is the foundation for both nominative fair use and first sale defenses, and "reflects the simple insight that anybody should be free to refer to goods and services by their brand names."
169
A. Repackaged, Repaired, Resold
There are several ways to use another's mark in commerce which do not constitute infringement. These include, among others, 170 (1) the vendor is selling repackaged goods; (2) the vendor is selling used or repaired goods; (3) or the vendor is reselling a genuine good. 171 While using a mark to identify repackaged goods may be done in a non-infringing way, the repackager does not receive absolute protection under the first sale doctrine-the repackaging "can present a non-trivial harm to the producer's good will, and can deceive consumers who, in addition to identifying the trademark, have come to expect or rely upon a particular type of packaging in their purchasing decisions."
172
When a "reseller's repackaging interferes with the trademark owner's ability to control the quality of its products . . . two harms can arise: harm to the consuming public in the form of deception and harm to the trademark owner in the form of loss of [good will]."
173 Consequently, as packaging becomes more and more important in swaying a potential consumer's purchasing decision, shoddy packaging may cause increasing harm to the mark owner's good will, resulting in a higher likelihood of trademark infringement liability. 174 In order to avoid Lanham Act liability, when sellers purchase genuine goods and then repackage the goods for resale, these resellers generally 168 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1992 ); Grynberg, supra note 18, at 956. 169 Grynberg, supra note 18, at 956. 170 must (1) disclose that they have repackaged the goods; (2) include their own name; (3) provide notice on the package that they are not affiliated with the manufacturer; and (4) must not give "undue prominence" to the good's mark. 175 These rules for repackaged goods illustrate the underlying philosophy governing all sellers and resellers-an obligation to tell the truth regarding the source of the goods. 176 Other resellers repair goods and then resell them with the original trademark on the goods or the packaging. 177 A reseller who is selling a repaired good "has the right to resell the original product with the original trademark attached, as long as he tells the truth about the origin of the repaired goods and about his responsibility for any repairs." 178 And just as a reseller must state that repackaged goods have been repackaged, a reseller of repaired goods must state that they have been repaired. 179 At some point, however, repairs may be so extensive that the product "cannot properly be considered the same any longer" 180 and the mark no longer truthfully describes the goods attached to it.
B. Trademark Nominative Fair Use
Supposedly, "[u]se of the mark alone is not sufficiently probative of" an intent to deceive the public into believing that the mark owner endorsed or somehow supported the defendant's products or services. 181 nominative fair uses are actions outside of trademark law, 182 and a defendant has a right to use a plaintiff's mark to truthfully describe the plaintiff's goods using the plaintiff's mark. 183 In his opinion in New Kids on the Block, Judge Alex Kozinski declared that courts may generalize a class of cases where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one. Such nominative use of a mark-where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service-lies outside the strictures of trademark law: Because it does not implicate the source-identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute unfair competition; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. 184 Yet in spite of its 20-year history, the nominative fair use defense has mostly been confined to the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, and is not well understood in any of them. 185 Indeed, in the Ninth Circuit, nominative fair use is not an affirmative defense; rather, it replaces likelihood of confusion in the plaintiff's prima facie case. 186 The Ninth Circuit declares that, in asserting nominative fair use, a defendant "need only show that it used the mark to refer to the trademarked good," 187 having the burden of proving that (1) the product or service in question is one not readily identifiable without the use of the trademark; and (2) only so much of the mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service.
188 "The burden then reverts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion,"
189 that the user has acted in a way "that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. The Fifth Circuit recommends-without requiring-that courts evaluate likelihood of confusion and nominative fair use simultaneously. 193 In contrast, in 2005, the Third Circuit designed its own two-step version of nominative fair use, whereby the plaintiff must prove likelihood of confusion under a modified likelihood-of-confusion test, which removes factors that are not appropriate in the context of nominative fair use. 194 This replaces the third part of the Ninth Circuit's test, instead asking whether "the defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant's products or services."
195 The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that its use is fair, under the court's own three-part nominative fair use test. 196 The First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have either rejected or declined to adopt nominative fair use, 197 and other courts have yet to decide on its adoption or rejection. 198 Cir. 2010 ) (holding that a "finding of nominative fair use is a finding that the plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement"). Thus, the burden ultimately rests on the plaintiff to establish that the use of the plaintiff's mark was not nominative fair use. Id. 195 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222. 196 Id. The defendant must show
(1) that the use of plaintiff's mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff's product or service and the defendant's product or service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff's mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff's product; and (3) that the defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant's products or services. The nominative fair use defense has been criticized for its analytical defects. As noted by Professor McGeveran, "[n]ominative fair use as it now exists has become ungainly and often unhelpful." 200 Professor McGeveran argues that there are three major issues with how courts apply a nominative fair use analysis. 201 First, the analysis typically occurs late in the litigation process rather than early in the process, when many defenses are adjudicated. 202 The second issue arises when courts become entangled in a foolish preliminary inquiry of asking whether the nominative fair use doctrine, rather than section 33(b)(4) [descriptive fair use], applies to particular facts. The third and most significant problem. . . is the collapse of the requirements for nominative fair use into a substitute likelihood of confusion analysis in a way that actually prejudices fair uses and further prolongs litigation. 203 Professor McGeveran also argues that "[t]his substitution also shifts burdens unfairly. Nominative use was not designed as a means to determine ultimate liability, but as a mechanism to set aside cases that fall outside the bounds of trademark law." 204 He evinces the Ninth Circuit's use of the doc-trine in a way that eviscerates nominative fair use's usefulness. 205 "Instead of serving as an early 'gatekeeper' that can screen out fair uses and reduce the length and cost of litigation, nominative fair use becomes just another fact-intensive confusion inquiry that may be brought only after extensive discovery." 206 Professor Graeme B. Dinwoodie likewise concludes that "the third part of the [Ninth Circuit's] test looks very much a proxy for an assessment of likely confusion as to association, sponsorship or endorsement."
Id
207 Professor Dinwoodie suggests "that it is time to treat nominative fair use as an autonomous and real defense, rather than simply a reformulation of the test for likely confusion." 208 Similarly, in his treatise, Professor Thomas McCarthy queries how the third part of the test differs from the ultimate issue that the three part test is supposed to facilitate: is there a likelihood of confusion? If it is not to be simply a repetition of the ultimate issue, . . . the third factor should be viewed as asking whether, in addition to mere use of the mark, defendant has engaged in some additional conduct that affirmatively suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the plaintiff. 209 These criticisms appear well-founded because some courts indeed evaluate the third part of the nominative fair use test using the same factors they use for likelihood of confusion. 210 Indeed, there should be some degree of confusion allowed without foreclosing that a defendant's use is objectively fair. 211 Professor McGeveran succinctly summarizes the confused and inadequate state of the nominative fair use defense:
[C]ourts have gradually larded up the simple idea of nominative fair use presented in New Kids to the point where it is excessively complex and minimally useful. By moving the doctrine away from any role as an early screening mechanism and closer in timing and substance 205 See generally id. at 88-97 (discussing the normative fair use doctrine). 206 Thus, this muddled application of nominative fair use has adversely affected the ability of online resellers' such as Karen Dudnikov and Amy Weber to truthfully describe their goods. 213 This unfairly strengthens mark owners' control over distribution channels for their goods beyond the initial sale to the public. 214 
C. That First Sale of a Genuine Good
The nominative fair use defense usually concerns comparative advertising 215 or other instances where the defendant is selling their own goods and in some way refers to the mark owner's goods. 216 Under first sale/exhaustion-which could be considered a variation of nominative fair use-the defendant does not use the plaintiff's mark in an effort to sell her own goods, but rather uses the plaintiff's mark to refer to the plaintiff's goods, albeit with the intention of selling the plaintiff's goods. 217 The first sale doctrine is based on the principle that trademark owners should not be able to control downstream sales of their goods. The rules governing the protection of trademarks are intended to prevent the diversion of trade or harm to reputation that is likely to result if consumers are confused as to the source or sponsorship of goods and services. Confusion does not occur, however, when a trademark is used to identify genuine goods marketed under that mark by the trademark owner. Thus, the trademark owner cannot ordinarily prevent or control the sale of goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted those goods to enter commerce. It can be said that the rights of the trademark owner are exhausted once the owner authorizes the initial sale of the product While first sale is legislatively created in the Copyright Act, 219 trademark and patent first sale (or exhaustion) affirmative defenses are longrecognized judicial constructs. 220 All three, however, serve a similar purpose: to "narrow[] the rights of the creator of intellectual property by creating competition between the creator and the reseller of the work."
221 As noted supra, 222 the Supreme Court has recognized as early as 1924 that, even though it results in the secondary market merchant getting some advantage from the mark, a mark may be used by a refurbisher or reseller of a good in a way that does not deceive the public. 223 Under the exhaustion doctrine, under the trademark or that the owner implicitly licenses others to further market the goods under the mark. Thus, no infringement occurs when the use of a mark properly identifies the source, sponsorship, or certification of the goods or services, even if the owner of the mark objects to the use.
Id.
For an in-depth discussion on the first sale rule and its rationale, see Barnes, supra note 87, at 461-69. 219 LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) ("The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."). 220 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v Cir. 2003) . One significant limitation on the first sale doctrine is that it only applies to unaltered or "genuine goods," unless the consumer has reason to know of the alterations. Therefore, using the mark in connection with the resale of a materially different product is trademark infringement. Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001 ). First Sale and nominative fair use defenses are inapplicable for altered goods, because "[a] materially different product is not genuine and may generate consumer confusion about the source and the quality of the trademarked product." Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 2009 ). In Beltronics, the Tenth Circuit stated that a difference is material if a consumer would consider the difference relevant in the decision to purchase the product. Id. at 1073. These differences are not limited to the physical product; they may include warranties and "service commitments." Id. Yet "[t]he purpose of the material difference test is to assist courts in determining whether allegedly infringing products are likely [VOL. 20:1
[t]he resale of genuine trademarked goods generally does not constitute infringement. This is for the simple reason that consumers are not confused as to the origin of the goods: the origin has not changed as a result of the resale. . . . [T]he trademark protections of the Lanham Act are exhausted after the trademark owner's first authorized sale of that product. Therefore, even though a subsequent sale is without a trademark owner's consent, the resale of a genuine good does not violate the Act. 224 It reflects a general public policy against restraints on alienation. 225 The Southern District of New York quite recently reaffirmed this longstanding principle in Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS HiFi, Inc. 226 -"as a general matter, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark owner."
227 The court reaffirmed that the "Lanham Act does not give mark owners the right to control subsequent, non-authorized resales, as long as the product sold is genuine."
228 In her opinion, Judge Colleen McMahon cites the long history in the Second Circuit recognizing that "the unauthorto cause confusion . . . and undermine the [good will] the trademark owner has developed . . . ." Id. at 1074. Therefore, material differences by themselves may not trigger liability. In other words, because the critical issue remains likelihood of confusion, material differences will not cause liability for trademark infringement as long as the seller dispels potential confusion by sufficiently disclosing material differences to the buyer. Id Cir. 1987 ) ("The reason is that trademark law is designed to prevent sellers from confusing or deceiving consumers about the origin or make of a product, which confusion ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is sold."). 225 Barnes, supra note 87, at 458, 462 ("The first sale rule reflects property law's distaste for restraints on alienation and allows the holder of intellectual property rights to obtain the price for its creations only once."). 226 Thus, a reseller has the right to dispose of genuine goods that were originally produced under the authority of the mark owner, provided that the goods are not materially altered and the reseller does not give the impression it is affiliated with the manufacturer. 230 "Resale by the first purchaser of the original article under the producer's trademark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition."
231 Because reselling the manufacturer's product can lead to some confusion as to the connection between the mark owner and the reseller, the first sale defense should not be rendered inapplicable merely because consumers erroneously believe the reseller is affiliated with or authorized by the producer. It is the essence of the "first sale" doctrine that a purchaser who does no more than stock, display, and resell a producer's product under the producer's trademark violates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act. When a purchaser resells a trademarked article under the producer's trademark, and nothing more, there is no actionable misrepresentation under the statute.
232
Courts should tolerate more confusion than they typically do where the defendant is using a mark similar to the plaintiff's to sell the defendant's own goods. 233 As noted by David Barnes, courts tend to treat first sale "as an affirmative defense to what would otherwise be an infringement of the creator's rights . . . [and] the trademark defendant has the burden of proving that it was reselling genuine and lawfully acquired goods."
234 However, it is the plaintiff's burden under the Lanham Act to establish likelihood of con- Apr. 30, 2012) (holding that reselling the mark owner's products for 50 percent below their retail price did not overcome the first sale doctrine, and dismissing the suit for failure to state a claim for allegations of trademark infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin). 230 See Champion Spark Plug Co. v mark owner could also be better handled through a claim of false advertising. 240 After all, courts have consistently held that [a] fter the first sale, the brandholder's control is deemed exhausted. Down-the-line retailers are free to display and advertise the branded goods. Secondhand dealers may advertise the branded merchandise for resale in competition with the sales of the markholder (so long as they do not misrepresent themselves as authorized agents).
241
Exhaustion should apply equally to online sales as it does to brick-andmortar stores. 242 Courts, however do not always do so, and-as discussed below-by supporting plaintiffs' claims of trademark infringement, they extend control over the distribution channels of goods beyond the initial sale.
243
IV. CHALLENGING THE MARK OWNER'S DESIRE FOR TOTAL CONTROL As illustrated supra, there is a need for comprehensive and definitive trademark nominative fair use and first sale doctrines with regard to online resale of genuine goods, along with more leeway regarding initial interest confusion related to distribution affiliation. 244 Our solutions are supported by recent trademark scholarship advocating the need for a showing of actual injury, rather than "merely a benefit to someone else." Plaintiffs bringing cases then would face a choice: (1) bring a trademark infringement claim and be required to prove confusion regarding actual source or responsibility for the quality of the defendant's goods or services; or (2) bring a false advertising-type claim alleging that the use causes some other form of confusion and be required to prove confusion about that relationship and that such confusion materially affects consumers' decisions whether to purchase the defendant's goods or services. 
A. Strengthening Available Defenses
In line with this current advocacy seeking to eliminate claims where there is no confusion as to source or responsibility or material confusion, 246 this Article proposes more specific solutions with regard to Internet resellers. There is a need for either the courts or Congress to rebalance the scales regarding trademark rights to prevent continued control by mark owners of the distribution of their products beyond the first sale. 247 However, "[a]bsent congressional action, courts have only a limited ability to correct the imbalance between trademark liability and defenses."
248 For a legislative solution that would protect resellers of genuine goods without affecting a mark owner's ability to remove counterfeit goods from the marketplace, Congress could add language to the Lanham Act which (1) codifies trademark first sale and nominative fair use as defenses under Section 33(b); (2) eliminates the controversial claim of initial interest confusion regarding the sale of genuine goods; and (3) specifies a requirement of deceptive intent regarding distribution affiliation confusion for it to be an actionable claim. 249 This would generate uniformity among the circuits regarding nominative fair use, initial interest confusion, and the robustness of the first sale doctrine with regard to trademarks. Professor Michael Grynberg notes that when Congress passed the Trademark Anti-Dilution Act, it "enact[ed] specific safe harbors for activities that are unlikely to cause confusion or those that may cause confusion, but whose social utility is high enough that the benefits of immunizing the acts outweigh any costs."
250
Since the trademark exhaustion doctrine has its roots in copyright law, 251 Copyright Act. 252 Similar language would provide uniformity across these two often-times related intellectual property claims. As discussed earlier, copyright and trademark infringement are often asserted in the same lawsuit. 253 If Lanham Act language clearly stated that the same first sale exception which applied for copyright also applied for the use of the mark attached to the goods, this would give resellers more certainty in their use of the mark owner's brand when identifying the mark owner's goods during resale.
This solution should lead to less litigation; however unless damages for frivolous suits are allowed, it may not stop the reality of cease-anddesist letters and threatened litigation. 254 Penalties for threats of frivolous litigation are common, and are part of anti-trust law, 255 Anti-SLAPP actions; motion to strike; discovery; remedies (a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances . . . [and] that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. . . . [Therefore:] (b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike . . . . [and] * * * (c)(1) . . . a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs. 
Id
B. Expect Some Confusion
As noted supra, courts should move back towards their "traditional willingness to permit a considerable degree of confusion in order to leave room" for competition. 259 Professor Jennifer E. Rothman contends that, with regard to metatags, domain names, and search engines, [t] he initial interest confusion doctrine. . . conflicts with specific well-established principles in trademark law. Trademark law, like copyright and patent law, provides that a consumer who purchases a good can freely resell that good without committing trademark infringement. Being able to resell goods necessitates the ability to advertise the sale of such goods. The initial interest confusion doctrine severely limits the freedom of consumers to resell products. 260 More broadly, Professor Glynn Lunney argues that, "we must limit actionable confusion to cases where, if the use is allowed to continue, a substantial number of purchasers or prospective purchasers will actually become confused concerning information that will materially influence their buying decisions."
261 As such, this Article argues that, unless the mark owner can show actual deception on the part of the reseller, as a general rule plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim initial interest confusion with regard to alternative distribution channels of genuine goods. 262 First, as long costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation."). 258 Though it would do little to prevent the sending of threatening cease-and-desist letters, this matter is a problem faced by copyright and patent defendants as well and not an issue that will be discussed in this Article. as there is no deception on the part of the reseller, any confusion as to "distribution channel" affiliation ends prior to the sale of the good. 263 Second, as noted earlier, many consumers visit sites like eBay and Craigslist for the purpose of finding genuine goods at lower costs than they would expect to find when buying directly from the mark owner or an authorized retailer. 264 Indeed, when a product is subject to first sale doctrine and the nominative fair use that accompanies it, some confusion should be expected. The Supreme Court declared in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc. 265 that, "[s]ince the burden of proving likelihood of confusion rests with the plaintiff, and the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show confusion unlikely, it follows . . . that some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use, and so it is." 266 Any initial confusion to the resale of a genuine good is related to the distribution source, not to the good itself; a claim of initial interest confusion should be a spurious allegation. 267 An assertion of confusion as to the distributor's affiliation should be discounted-after all, there is no confusion as to the source of the good; the mark owner is truthfully the source of the good. And to hold a defendant liable for infringement where there may only be initial confusion as to whether the distribution channel is associated with the mark owner results in the mark owner controlling subsequent sales of his or her product. 268 Although courts have declared that "[a]ffiliation confusion exists where use of a 'unique and recognizable identifier' could lead consumers to 'infer a relationship' between the trademark owner and the new product[,]" 269 this should not apply to the distribution of the goods after the initial sale, but rather only to the good itself. Otherwise, a finding of initial interest affiliation confusion because the seller is not affiliated with the mark owner would eviscerate any protection afforded through trademark law's first sale/exhaustion principle. 270 Because of the controversial nature of the claim, we should question whether initial interest affiliation confusion matters at all with regard to the secondary sale of goods. Courts have found such a claim spurious. In her concurrence in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 271 Judge Marsha Berzon contended that it was not "reasonable to find initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him." 272 Yet this form of confusion has been successfully asserted in Internet resale cases. 273 Juries and judges have supported a finding of infringement based on initial interest affiliation confusion as to the distribution channel of the good, 274 and have often discounted any first sale or nominative fair use defense. 275 Judges and juries seem to hold Internet sales to a different standard than consignment and resale shops in the brick-and-mortar world, where a plaintiff would face a much higher hurdle to show customer confusion with regard to distribution affiliation. 276 There should be a presumption of non-infringement when a product's brand is used in the advertising for the reselling of an item-including in the description of it or use of a photograph of the item in an online sale. This presumption would shift the burden of proof-rather than the resellerdefendant asserting nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff would have to overcome this presumption as part of his or her prima facie case. 277 Without a proven deception by the reseller, confusion as to affiliation with regard to distribution channels should be negated by the fact that the goods in question are genuine goods, and there is no confusion as to the actual source of the goods. As Justice Antonin Scalia stated in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 278 "[t]he words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers." 279 As long as the goods are genuine, we must even question whether the purchaser is initially confused regarding the reseller's lack of affiliation with the mark owner. 280 Indeed, when looking even more generally at sponsorship or affiliation confusion, Professors Lemley and McKenna provide a strong argument that the "point is not that consumers can never be harmed by confusion regarding non-quality-related relationships. Rather, the point is that the sort of attenuated confusion at issue in sponsorship and affiliation cases does not necessarily or even often harm consumers or the market for quality products[,]" 281 and the costs of protecting consumers from this form of confusion is unreasonably high. 282 "In delineating the boundary between fair and unfair competition, we must keep firmly in mind that if competition is to remain an effective force for promoting social welfare, we must leave room for would-be competitors to operate."
C. Resellers as a Class of Plaintiffs
Suppose Karen Dudnikov contacted other eBay resellers who had faced similar problems, and they banded together as a class of plaintiffs to enjoin MLB and other repeat accusers from shutting them down. As discussed supra, resellers individually may not suffer enough damage to bring a viable lawsuit themselves. 284 Forming a class of plaintiffs, however, would be more economical and encourage settlement as well. 285 "Class relief is 'peculiarly appropriate' when the 'issues involved are common to the class as a whole' and when they 'turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. ' " 286 Yet class actions are a rarity in the world of trademark law due to significant procedural difficulties. sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 288 The first two requirements of Rule 23(a), numerosity and commonality, "form the core of the class-action concept."
289 There would seem to be little difficulty in meeting the numerosity requirement. The site eBay alone boasts over 94 million users. 290 If only 1 in 10,000 users had an auction closed or account unjustly terminated, that calculates to over 9,000 potential class members. And that considers only eBay users; it does not include resellers who have their own websites or use other online auction sites. Having as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is impracticable and the numerosity requirement has been met. 291 In addition, Internet resellers are spread across the globe, which tends to make joinder impracticable. 292 Regarding commonality, whether the trademark owner made a goodfaith inquiry into infringement before sending a takedown notification to eBay is one question of law and fact common to the class. 293 Commonality requires that the class members "have suffered the same injury."
294 Recently, an eBay user brought such a claim against Coach, Inc. 295 Gina Kim was a former employee of Coach who tried selling a genuine Coach handbag on eBay. 296 Coach notified eBay, claiming the handbag was counterfeit, and eBay closed Ms. Kim's auction and terminated her seller account. 297 Ms. Kim sued for a declaratory judgment, among other claims, and attempted to certify a class of all consumers in Washington State who had received similar treatment from Coach. 298 Ms. Kim alleged that Coach had no basis in fact for its allegation she was selling a counterfeit handbag. 299 This appears to be a sufficiently common question. 300 Even though generally trademark law may be rife with factual disputes, if the legal issue can be framed properly in terms of the trademark owner's lack of inquiry and the reseller's defense under first sale, then the matter is ripe for adjudication as a class action-because the "determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Inc., 302 found the commonality requirement was met based on the allegation that the defendants had allegedly engaged in a deceptive scheme to benefit from the plaintiffs' trademarks. 303 Thus, the common question can center on the defendants' actions. 304 the litigation process for an improper purpose, whether or not the claim is colorable."
317 Other circuits will award attorneys' fees for bad faith or a "[w]illfulness short of bad faith."
318 These standards may be difficult to meet, yet trademark owners are acting in bad faith by accusing Internet resellers of infringement, not because they are infringing, but because they are competing for sales. 319 
FINAL THOUGHTS
Protecting the resale market increases consumer choice and spurs mark owners to innovate and bring new and improved products to the market. 320 If we allow mark owners to prevent the resale of their goods, consumers lose out on the competition that resellers provide. 321 Legislatively created first sale and nominative fair use doctrines, along with the elimination of initial interest confusion as a cause of action under the Lanham Act, would provide resellers and auction websites guidance in navigating the minefield of rights and duties with regard to Internet secondary-market sales, so that they more closely resemble the brick-and-mortar setting. 322 This would support the economic policy goals underlying intellectual property 323 Cir. 1997) competition and innovation in the marketplace. 324 These solutions would also benefit consumers looking for bargains and align trademark exhaustion in cyberspace with its application with brick-and-mortar settings. 325 Copyright 326 and patent 327 laws have robust first sale defenses, which severely limit ongoing rights of the copyright and patent owner beyond the first authorized sale of the material object which embodies the intellectual property right(s) at issue. 328 However, the weakening of trademark first sale doctrine with regards to online sales and advertising has, to some extent, led to an "end run" around copyright first sale. 329 This dilution has increasingly allowed trademark, patent, and copyright owners to extend control over the resale of their goods, even though this restraint has consistently been rejected. 330 In its construction and interpretation of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court has "been 'careful to caution against misuse or over-extension' of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright." 331 After all, "[t]he rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 'carefully crafted bargain,' under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution." 332 And both courts and Congress are loath to extend through trademark that which has been lost through the expiration of a patent or copyright. 333 ment defense. 334 Nominative fair use must actually be accepted by the courts. In "brick-and-mortar" settings, there is no confusion as to affiliation with the mark owner with regard to distribution channels-it would be difficult to believe that a consumer would think that a consignment shop or antique store was affiliated with the mark owners of all the goods sold at such venues. The same should hold equally true in cyberspace.
